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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Comes now the Defendant, M. J. Conoco Distributors, Inc., 
acting by and through its attorneys Allen H. Tibbals and Michael 
z. Hayes of the law firm of Tibbals and Staten, and under and 
pursuant to Rule 76(e) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, peti-
tions this Court for a rehearing or a modification of the decision 
of this Court in the above captioned matter for the reason and 
upon the grounds that: 
1. This Court failed to accord to the proceedings 
before this Court, due process in that: 
a. The Court has rendered its decision acting on an 
erroneous fundamental premise which is not supported in the record 
or the briefs of either party, to-wit, that "The service station 
at issue in the litigation was owned by the Plaintiff-Appellant." 
(Opinion Justice Stewart dated March 6th, 1979, first sentence.) 
The opinion continues, "Plaintiff leased the station to Defen-
dant .•. " This also is not a fact and cannot be supported from 
either the briefs or the record. These erroneous assumptions 
color the entire decision of the Court. 
The fact as shown by the record and briefs of the parties 
show without contradiction that the station was built by Defendant-
Respondent in 1972 and at all times was and now is owned by 
Defendant-Respondent M. J. Conoco. (RlS,36,119,5, Respondent's 
Brief page 1,3) Under the assumption made by the Court, the 
capital at risk in the venture and the relationship between 
-2-
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the parties is entirely at variance from the actual facts wi~ 
which the District Court dealt. 
b· This Court acted peremptorily at the hearing before 
the Court, ordering the Defendant-Respondent to proceed first 
in the argument before the Court stating that it did so, as 
voiced by Chief Justice Crockett, who said in essence that this 
case was before the Court on appeal from a summary judgment 
based upon motion supported by affidavit which the Court did 
not favor and the Court believed therefore that this placed Ue 
weight of persuasion upon the Respondent to show cause why the 
Court should not reverse the decision of the lower court inasmuch 
as there appeared to be factual issues disputed. Even when 
Respondent brought to the attention of the Court that this was 
erroneous and that, in fact, the matter was before the Courton 
appeal from a directed verdict granted by the Court on motion 
of Defendant-Respondent after four full days of trial and one-
half days of argument before the court sitting with a jury, and 
that the Court had granted the directed verdict because of the 
failure of the plaintiff to prove its case, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless compelled the Defendant-Respondent to go forward 
first with its argument and refused, at the close of argument, to 
allow the privilege usually accorded the Appellant of a rebuttal 
to the argument of the Respondent. We believe this to be a sig· 
· ct on nificant departure from established procedure having an impa 
-3-
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the decision of the Court because the Court has incorporated 
into its opinion, unrefuted statements made in the oral argu-
ment by counsel for the Appellant which, had the Respondent 
been accorded its opportunity to respond to the Appellant, 
would have been properly refuted. By so altering its procedure 
and by failing to examine the record with sufficient care to 
ascertain even the fundamentals of the ownership of the pro-
perty involved and the nature of the contract between the parties, 
the Defendant-Respondent has not had due process or a fair and 
impartial hearing before this Court which is the right of the 
Defendant-Respondent under the laws and the Constitution of 
this State and of the United States. As a result thereof, the 
Defendant-Respondent is confronted with a determination by this 
Court that the Appellant owns the service station and that the 
agreement between the parties is a lease thereof. This confronts 
the Defendant-Respondent with an unconsciounable burden on retrial 
and the peril that the unsupported and incorrect statement of 
this Court may be alleged to be Res Judicata and binding on 
parties to this litigation. 
2. The decision of this court ignores the established 
rule that it is the Plaintiff's burden to establish his primae 
facia case as to the existence of an actual breach of contract 
and damages resulting to the Plaintiff therefrom by credible 
evidence which would hold to the minimum, speculation by the jury 
-4-
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acting under accepted standards and the guidance of the Court's 
instructions. 
After four full days of trial devoted exclusively to 
the Plaintiff's presentation of his evidence and after the 
Plaintiff had rested, the trial judge recognized that there was 
not sufficient credible evidence to present to the jury as to 
either the breach of contract as claimed by the Plaintiff, nor 
as to any measurable damage resulting to the Plaintiff. The 
action of the lower court in giving the directed verdict was take 
after prolonged argument by counsel and due deliberation by the 
Court. The serious deficiencies in the Plaintiff's case were 
carefully evaluated by the lower court and the Court's action is 
entitled to the respect long recognized as due the action of the 
lower court which has the opportunity to evaluate the testimony 
of the witnesses, their conduct on the stand, validity, the 
quality of the evidence presented and the nature of the presenta· 
tion. The opinion of the Supreme Court ignores the existing 
standards by which the lower court acted and gives no new guide· 
lines on which a retrial can be based. 
Defendant-Respondent submits herewith its Brief in 
Support of the within Petition in accordance with the Rule$ of 
Civil Procedure in such cases made and provided. 
-5-
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BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Point I 
BY FAILING TO EXAMINE THE RECORD BEFORE IT IN 
THE INSTANT CASE WITH SUFFICIENT CARE TO BE 
APPRISED OF THE FUNDAMENTAL FACTS UPON WHICH 
THIS LITIGATION IS BASED, THIS COURT HAS MADE 
AN ERRONEOUS FINDING CONCERNING THE OWNERSHIP 
OF THE SERVICE STATION AND THE NATURE OF THE AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH, IF NOT CORRECTED, 
COULD BE CLAIMED TO HAVE MADE THESE MATTERS RES 
JUDICATA AT THE REHEARING OF THE CASE, THUS 
IMPOSING ON DEFENDANT AN UNFAIR AND UNCONSCION-
ABLE BURDEN AND DEPRIVING DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
OF A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS. 
The introductory statement of the Court's official opinion 
filed in this case March 6th, 1979, is as follows: 
"The Plaintiff below and Appellant here (herein-
after or sometimes "Lessor") owns a gasoline service 
station on the interstate highway between Salt Lake 
and Wendover at an isolated location known as 'Delle' 
about 53 miles west of Salt Lake City. Plaintiff 
leased the station to Defendant. " 
This is not the fact. The record shows, (TR pp36&37, Exhibit 6) 
as do the briefs of the parties, that the service station, sub-
ject matter of the controversy and litigation, was built by the 
Defendant-Respondent, M. J. Conoco, at its expense, was owned by 
the Defendant Company at all times and is still owned by that 
Company. 
The Court's decision erroneously states that the service 
station is owned by the Plaintiff-Appellant rather than the 
-6-
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Defendant-Respondent. This error is extremely prejudicial to 
the Defendant in that it is a judicial determination as to the 
ownership of the service station and could, therefore, be con-
sidered as Res Judicata at the retrial of the case. Defendant· 
Respondent respectfully submits that this fundamental error 
requires either that Defendant-Respondent be given the opportuni: 
of a rehearing in the Supreme Court on this matter or, at least, 
that the opinion of the Court be amended to correct the mistate· 
ment of fact concerning the ownership of the service station and 
to show that the agreement of the parties was not a lease of the 
service station, but of the land on which the station was built 
by M. J. Conoco, Defendant-Respondent, and at all times the owner 
thereof. 
It was always the risk capital of M. J. Conoco that was 
involved in the building and operation of the service station, 
not that of the Plaintiff-Appellant. The error in this funda-
mental concept colors the entire opinion of this Court and the 
failure to ascertain this fact from the record which is replete 
with reference to the fact that the station was built and owned 
by M. J. Conoco, is not due process and deprives the Defendant· 
Respondent of a fair and impartial evaluation of the facts in 
this case and the law which should be applied thereto. It 
prevents a fair review of the lower court's action,for that 
· was Court, at all times, recognized that ownership of the station 
in Defendant-Respondent. 
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The law of property has long recognized that one's 
failure, if it can be found that there was such a failure, to 
operate or to employ his own property to the best advantage, 
constitutes a far different legal wrong than to fail to operate 
or to manage the property belonging to another properly and in 
accordance with contract. In fact, conduct in the handling, 
management and control of property entrusted to one by another, 
whether by lease or otherwise, may be a wrong when such treatment 
of one's own property would constitute no wrong whatever. Such 
is an important aspect of this case, for here the station had 
been built, the capital at risk and all of the responsibility 
therefore was that of the Defendant-Respondent, M. J. Conoco 
Distributors, Inc. It had built the station on land leased from 
the Appellant and fundamental to the concept of the relationship 
was that an equal or greater investment in a restaurant facility 
was to be made by the Plaintiff-Appellant to become a part of the 
total package which induced M. J. Conoco to make the investment 
for the service station. This reciprocal duty colored the entire 
transaction relating to the hours of operation, it being contem-
plated that the station and the restaurant together, in a 24-hour 
operation, would be an attractive thing at this location and 
would entice the public to patronize both the service station 
and the restaurant. Either alone had a much more hazardous and 
less likely chance of success and, in fact, were so isolated that 
-8-
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the singular operation of the service station alone, without 
the required restaurant facility, was an economic impossibility, 
These facts are clear from the reading of the record and were 
understood by the trial court at the time that he granted 
Defendant-Respondent's motion for a directed verdict. 
Point II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY ACQUITTED HIS 
RESPONSIBILITY TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES REGARDING CONSTRUCTION 
OF A LAGOON. WITHOUT SHOWING ANY ERROR IN 
LAW OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE 
TRIAL COURT, THIS COURT HAS REVERSED THE TRIAL 
COURT RESULTING IN DEPRIVING THE DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The lower court recognized and applied the correct rule 
and measure of damages to the situation regarding the construe· 
tion of the sewage lagoon as cited by this Court, namely: 
"The measure of damages where there has been 
defective or incomplete performance of a construc-
tion contract is as set forth in the Restatement 
of Contracts, Section 346(1) 1932 as: 
'· •• the reasonable cost of construction 
and completion in accordance with the con-
tract, if this is possible and does not 
involve unreasonable economic waste; .. '" 
(Opinion of March 6, pg. 5) (Emphasis ours) 
This point was raised in the Court below and Plaintiff 
refused to accept the Court's ruling. The Plaintiff insisted 
-9-
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that he was entitled to the monthly return he expected to 
receive on a restaurant facility which he, of his own violition, 
elected not to build. The argument on this point between court 
and counsel for Plaintiff is contained in the record. (Pgs. A-41 
line 22 to A-45 line 25.) 
Both the attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant and the 
Judge recognized the facts testified to and even admitted by 
the Supreme Court in its decision that the lagoon could not be 
completed and made functional without the effluent from the 
restaurant. The lagoon could not be created or maintained with-
out this effluent from an economic standpoint because the presence 
of water in the lagoon was essential to its maintenance. Water 
could only be made available by hauling it by truck. To haul 
water solely for the purpose of making the lagoon functional 
was economic waste. The lower court recognized this. 
In view of the refusal of the Plaintiff-Appellant to 
abide by the decision of the Court and to make any effort to 
show damages as requested by the lower court, does this appellate 
Court have the right to ignore the situation and simply overlook 
the defiance of the Plaintiff-Appellant, and give him a further 
opportunity to again try to make his case, and still stay within 
the purview of due process. At some point the rights of the other 
litigant should be considered. We submit that by refusing to 
conform to the ruling of the Court and accept the measure of 
-10-
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damages which the lower court imposed correctly, according to 
the decision of the Supreme Court, the Plaintiff-Appellant is 
precluded from putting the Defendant-Respondent to the expense 
of a further trial on the same issues which were knowledgably 
and correctly ruled on by the lower court as shown by the record. 
Judge Leary correctly stated: 
"And there isn't any reason in here that he 
couldn't have built a restaurant if he wanted to 
and he elected not to do so. And his reason for 
electing not to do so is that he claims that this 
man or the corporation breached the agreement and 
his damages that he is asking are based upon a 
decision that he made. It has nothing to do with 
what the Defendant may have done." 
Obviously Judge Leary decided, after hearing all of the testimony 
at trial, that the contract required the Plaintiff to build his 
restaurant before he could complain that the sewage lagoons were 
not completed. It was Judge Leary's prerogative to weigh the 
testimony on this issue and make a decision which he did in fact 
do. The Defendant should not be compelled to retry this issue 
when Judge Leary has already made a judicial determination as 
to the construction of the contract which determination was not 
passed upon by the Appellate Court - simply ignored. 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point III 
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY EXCUSING 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FROM THE NECESSITY TO 
MAKE OUT A PRIMAE FACIA CASE, THE STANDARD TO 
WHICH HE WAS HELD BY THE LOWER COURT IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT, DEPRIVES 
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS. 
The burden of the Plaintiff in any action is to make a 
primae facia case before he rests, which includes the necessary 
proofs from which, in a contract action, the breach of contract 
can be shown and the quantum of damages be reasonably determined. 
(Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. vs. Landis, 503 P2d 444, 28 U2d 392, 
also Keesling vs. Bosamalsis, 539 P2d 1043.) 
The Plaintiff in four days of trial did neither. He 
presented some evidence that the service station in question was 
not open at a few given times. The duration or frequency of 
closure was not given in any manner, though it could have been 
had the Complaint been legitimate for the Plaintiff had employees 
in the area who could have kept track of the hours of closure 
if it was significant to do so. Under the status of the limited 
testimony available on closure of the station, how could the 
jury be instructed to determine the amount of time closed? Should 
the jury be allowed to go to the jury room, where they are not 
going to receive any further enlightenment than had been presented, 
and decide that the station was closed one day a week, two days 
a week, one hour a month, three hours, or whatever? There is 
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not one word of guidance from which the jury could logically 
make a finding as to the amount of time lost in the three year 
period of time involved in the litigation. It would be outright 
speculation with no guidance of any kind. 
Secondly, there was absolutely no credible evidence to 
show that if the station was closed it affected the quantity of 
gasoline which would have been sold. No gallonage had been 
guaranteed. The Court was well aware that the Plaintiff was 
receiving a substantial land rental every month in excess of the 
reasonable value of this isolated land and that it had been paid 
without fail. Plaintiff relied on the testimony of a so called 
"expert" who admitted he had no actual knowledge of the operatin~ 
conditions at the station, had never worked there, did not know 
anything about the traffic pattern except from a study which 
he misread and for which, (though admittedly the error was sig· 
nificant and plaintiff's counsel knew of the error) no effort 
was made to either offer corrective testimony or to rehabilitate 
the evidence. Despite this, the opinion of the Supreme Court is 
stated to be that the lower court should have allowed the jury 
to speculate as to the loss of gallonage sales. To do so is 
an abuse of due process and flies in the face of every case 
this Court has heretofore decided on the issue. The court refers 
to the FEDECO case (23 U2d 306, 462 P2d 706 [1969]) as supportin: 
the statement that "some degree of uncertainty is inevitable in 
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the damage determinations of the type involved in this suit." 
To be sure this is true, but since the writer tried and was 
attorney of record in the Fedeco case and is therefore thoroughly 
familiar with that case on both the original trial, the appeal 
and the retrial, the degree of uncertainty there was in no 
way comparable to this case and the case cannot stand for 
support of the primae facia case presented by the Plaintiff in 
the instant case. There was absolutely no uncertainty as to the 
breach of contract in the Fedeco case. The contract called 
for the delivery of a certain amount of leased space. The amount 
actually made available was known. The breach was clear and 
specific. There were issues as to whether the change had been 
consented to by the Plaintiff, but the claimed breach was not 
uncertain in any particular. The measure of the damages was the 
loss in sales resulting from the lack of space. Contrary to 
the situation in this case where absolutely no reliable evidence 
as to the gallonage which should have been sold or might have 
been sold in the subject station was offered, in the Fedeco case 
there was an actual traffic count of the number of people 
entering the building. There were comparative sales figures 
covering adjoining space during the exact time in question, 
there were figures showing the rate of increase in business of 
the other businesses in the same building during the same time. 
There were valid comparative studies showing the relationship 
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in sales volume between the type of merchandise offered by the 
plaintiff in that case and similar merchandise offered in ad-
joining space. The only speculation the jury was required to 
make in the Fedeco case was whether other factors regarding 
management policies of the particular plaintiff would make these 
figures which were offered inapplicable. Contrast that with the. 
present case. No hours of failure of operation of the station 
has been shown. No sales figures of the station in question 
or any station in the vicinity during the period in question 
have been shown or offered. The only gallonage figures have 
been figures based on an Exhibit which covers a period more than 
two years prior to the questioned period, taken under circumstanw 
that were admittedly totally different than_ the existing cir-
cumstances at the time of the alleged breach. There is no 
guidance from which the jury can make any computation. It is 
straight speculation. In the Fedeco case, the jury had a definite 
formula to apply to ascertain what might have been done without 
the breach. The only thing that could not be made relatively 
certain was the impact of the plaintiff's merchandising policies 
on these figures. A vastly different situation than confronted 
the lower court in this case. The lower court has correctly 
exercised its prerogative to take the case from the jury because 
the Plaintiff failed in four days of trial to make out the essen· 
tials of a prima facia case. The decision of the Supreme court 
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points out no error of the lower court in making its ruling. It 
gives no guidelines or standards by which the Court can guide 
the jury in a retrial of the case. To impose on the Defendant-
Respondent for a retrial under such circumstances is not due 
process and it is not justice. It simply gives the Plaintiff-
Appellant another swing at the same ball which it missed the 
first time. Up to this case it has not been considered due 
process to give the Plaintiff three strikes before declaring him 
out. To rely on the "connnon sense of the jury" to make up for 
the imprecise proof of breach and of damages, as the opinion of 
this Court does (Opinion Pg. 4, last paragraph) in an area of 
life in which the average juror has no experience, namely service 
station operation at an isolated outpost, licenses abuse of the 
jury function. 
Point IV 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT ADMITS THAT THE LOWER 
COURT MAY HAVE ERRED ON THE GROUNDS ON WHICH IT 
EXCLUDED EXHIBIT 35, A GALLONAGE TABLE, BUT 
CONTINUES TO RULE THAT THE EXHIBIT IS RELEVANT 
AND ADMISSIBLE. THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ATTACKED 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE EXHIBIT ON OTHER GROUNDS 
WHICH STILL EXIST, AND WHICH MAKE THE EXHIBIT IN-
ADMISSIBLE, AND THE STATEMENTS MADE IN ORAL ARGU-
MENT WHICH RESPONDENT HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE 
AND UPON WHICH THE SUPREME COURT APPARENTLY RELIED 
IN RULING THE EXHIBIT ADMISSIBLE ARE NOT CORRECT. 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE COURT OPINION, IF ALLOWED TO 
STAND, WILL MEAN THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT IS CON-
FRONTED ON RETRIAL WITH AN EXHIBIT WHICH THIS COURT 
HAS STATED IS ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT EVER HAVING BEEN 
CORRECTLY OR PROPERLY ADVISED AS TO THE FOUNDATIONAL 
DEFECTS. 
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Plaintiff-Appellant had the opportunity at trial to 
establish relevancy of Exhibit 35 which he could not do. The 
facts are uncontested that Exhibit 35 represents gasoline sold 
at a different service station for the first six months of 1972, 
Under any standard heretofore recognized by this Court, this 
Exhibit is not admissible. We submit that to deprive the 
Defendant-Respondent of his right to object on that basis, de-
prives Defendant-Respondent of due process. The decision of thi; 
Court gives no guidelines as to what use can be made of Exhibit 
35 at the retrial of this matter. As mentioned in the Court's 
decision, the Appellant does not argue about the inadrnissibiliti 
of gallonage reports from other service stations, yet as the 
decision now stands, a new jury would be allowed to use an Ex-
hibit that represents gallonage sold at a different service 
station under totally different circumstances, for over half 
the period covered by the Exhibit, which was more than two years 
prior to the period in question in the instant litigation. 
This Court has never heretofore allowed a jury to speculate as 
to damages through the use of figures representing sales at a 
different location under different circumstances occurring more 
than two years prior to the questioned period. Petitioner 
·respectfully submits that Exhibit 35 is simply not capable 
of being applied to the factual situation in this case. The 
fact that the Court gave as its reason for excluding the Exhibit, 
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a reason other than foundational, should not deprive the Defen-
dant-Respondent of the right to challenge the Exhibit on founda-
tional grounds as was done (Rl35, L-3-13) and to have the court 
rule thereon. The decision of the Appellate Court recites: 
"The sales data of the Delle station for 
1972, the last year the station was concededly 
in nearly continuous operation." (Opinion Pg. 3 
1st paragraph) 
These factual assumptions by the Court are not true as an exami-
nation of the Record shows. The lower court was aware of these 
deficiencies in the Exhibit as the testimony showing the defi-
ciencies was given before that court. 
Again, in this instance it was within Judge Leary's 
clearly defined prerogatives, as outlined by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, to exclude this Exhibit when it was shown to him to 
in fact represent gallonage sold at a different service station 
and under very different circumstances. 
Point v 
THE CHAi.~GE OF ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES BY THIS 
COURT WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE PARTIES AND WITH-
OUT ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE AND MEET 
THE CHALLENGE, CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
In this case, on the date of oral argument, when the 
case was called before the Court by the Chief Justice, and 
counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant announced that he would 
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require in the presentation of his argument to the court a full 
20 minutes, the maximum allowed by the Court for oral argument 
I 
the comments of the Chief Justice then made clear that this 
Court did not accord to this litigation much significance and 
felt that the matter did not merit that much time of the court. 
Subsequently, when the argument was actually called for, the 
Chief Justice announced that, in the Court's opinion, the usual 
procedures of the Court should be reversed and in place of the 
Plaintiff-Appellant presenting his argument first and the Respon· 
dent being allowed to answer the same, by reason of the fact tho: 
this case was before the Court on a Summary Judgment granted on 
Motion and Affidavit, the weight of pursuasion lay with the 
Defendant-Respondent for it appeared to the Court that there 
were factual issues which should have been determined on trial 
and that therefore, the Court wished the Defendant-Respondent 
to show to the Court for what reason the Court should not rever> 
the action of the lower court. As promptly as could be, counsel 
for the Defendant-Respondent advised the Court of its primary 
error, namely that this case was not before the Court on a 
Summary Judgment supported by Affidavit and based upon Motion, 
but was there after a week's full trial before court and jury 
wherein the Plaintiff had been unable to prove its case and the 
court had therefore entered a directed verdict because there was 
not sufficient proof to submit to the jury. Despite being nofr 
-19-
• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fied and advised of its error, the Court nevertheless persisted 
in requiring the Defendant-Respondent to proceed with the oral 
argument. 
In the argument made by the Plaintiff-Appellant, an 
attorney who was not party to the action in the lower court 
and who therefore spoke only from his understanding of the 
record and not from knowledge of what had transpired in the 
lower court, was permitted to make statements which were in-
correct and which, had the Defendant-Respondent been allowed its 
ordinary position, would have been refuted in the argument of 
the Defendant-Respondent. When Defendant-Respondent, through 
its counsel, asked whether or not he was to be accorded some 
time in rebuttal as would be the case having assumed the argu-
ment position of the Appellant, the Court denied this privilege 
stating through the Chief Justice that the Court was going to 
adjourn for lunch and that unless there was something of critical 
importance that could be presented in one minute, there was 
nothing more that the Court desired to hear. This unusual 
procedure, contrary to the established procedures of the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah for generations, fails to accord with 
the standards of due process recognized by the Constitution of 
the State of Utah and the Constitution of the United States. 
While the irregularity in procedure could perhaps be overlooked 
under normal circumstances, the fact that the Court was misled 
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by statements made by the counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant 
which found their way into the Court's opinion in deciding the 
case and which are refuted by the record, lend significance and 
importance to the irregularity of the procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel for Defendant-Respondent feels compelled by 
duty and responsibility to the client, as well as by his obli-
gation to this Court as a member of the bar of this court, to 
attempt by this petition and supporting brief to bring to the 
court's attention significant discrepancies between the facts 
related in the Court's decision, as the basis upon which it 
decided the case, and the actual uncontested and admitted facts 
as shown by the Record and briefs on file in the action. These 
fundamental errors have manifestly influenced not only the 
outcome of this case on appeal, but unchallenged and uncontested, 
they constitute a threat to the ability of the Defendant-Respon-
dent to have fair and impartial treatment on a retrial of the 
case. These erroneous statements pose the hazard that they may 
be claimed to be binding, factual determinations by this Court 
and Res Judicata. 
We respectfully submit to the Court that any litigant 
is entitled to have the Appellate Court evaluate the case starting 
from the same basic premise and admitted factual situations as 
the lower court had before it in taking whatever action the 
lower court took - particularly when the fact is as fundamental 
as the ownership of the property involved. 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
We believe that even in the unlikely event that this 
Court should be of the opinion that these factual errors could 
not change the Court's ultimate opinion, the Petitioner is 
entitled to have the decision of the Court corrected so that it 
contains a true and accurate statement of the admitted facts and, 
on retrial, the Defendant-Respondent is not handicapped by being 
confronted with the necessity to try and overcome the impression 
created on the trial court by the errors in the decision sending 
the case back for retrial. We also believe that the Court shoulc 
correct the decision wherein it would deprive the Defendant and 
Respondent on retrial of the right to challenge the Plaintiff-
Appellant's proposed gallonage Exhibit for foundational defects. 
As pointed out, the language of the decision would seem to m~e 
this Exhibit admissible when the fact that foundational facts 
essential to this admission have never been ruled on by the lower 
court. 
We humbly, sincerely, and respectfully beseach this 
Court to take cognizance of the plight of the Defendant-Responder 
and accord to this litigant fair and just relief from the unearn: 
and improper burden imposed by the Court's decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TIBBALS AND STATEN 
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